Editorial Advisory CommitteeMember DR. P C. BASU, Head, Civil & Structural Engineering Division (C&SED). SHRI D. DE, Head, Reactor Installation Division (RID). SHRI P.K. GHOSH, Head, Industrial & Radiation Safety Division (1&RSD). SHRI S.K. CHANDE Head, Operating Plants Safety Division (OPSD). SHRI S.K. AGARWAL Head, Nuclear Safety Division (NSD). SHRI A.R. SUNDARARAJAN, Head, Health Safety Division (H&SD). Convenor SMT. S. BHATTACHARYA, Scientific Officer, Industrial & Radiation Safety Division Editor DR. K.S. PARTHASARATHY, Secretary AERB & Head, Scientific & Technical Services Division (S & TSD) |
EditorialNo Scientific Evidence on higher Incidence Of Cancer other than Thyroid Cancers in Children Due To The Accident At Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station The much awaited Report of the United Nationals Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) is issued. The two giant volumes contain massive amount of useful data. It may take several days of painstaking effort to assimilate the data and the conclusions. The papers presented at the Tenth International Congress of the Intentional Radiation Protection Association (IRPA- 10) at Hiroshima gave glimpses of the report. The report concluded thus: · There have been about 1800 cases of thyroid cancers in children in Belarus, the Russian federation and Ukraine. More cases may occur in the coming decades. There were problems associated with the screening of thyroid cancers, in spite of that these cancers were most likely caused by radiation exposure received at the time of the accident. The high incidence and short period induction are unusual May be there are other factors influencing the risk. · No increase in leukemia or other cancers have been detected not even among the workers engaged in the recovery operations. These workers were exposed to higher doses of radiation. Generally, leukemia is the first cancer to appear after radiation exposure as its latency period is only 2-10 years. · The committee referred to the tendency to attribute increases in the rate of all cancers over time to the Chernobyl accident and observed that the increases were observed in the affected areas before the accident. Recently, a general increase in deaths has been reported in most areas of the former Soviet Union, this must also be considered while interpreting the results of Chernobyl related studies. · The incident had a large negative psychological impact on thousands of people. · There has been no increase in non-malignant disorders that can be directly related to the radiation exposure. · There is no convincing scientific evidence that cancer risk from exposure to radiation disappears allow doses. (The Committee was not thus inclined to accept the threshold concept or the hormesis theory-radiation is beneficial though their proponents argue their case passionately and persuasively!) · The Committee estimates that the cancer risks are 4% - 6% per sievert at low to moderate doses. This estimate is similar to its previous estimates. Medical exposure is a large and growing radiation source. A disproportionate increase is due to the new high dose procedure’s such as computed tomography and interventional procedures (such as dilatation of coronary arteries). Though computed tomography constitutes only a few percent of the procedures, they account for nearly half of the exposure involved in medical diagnosis in developed countries. The average radiation doses (in mSv) to population due to natural and man-mode radiation sources are natural: 2.4; diagnostic medical exam : 0.4; Atmospheric weapon testing : 0.005; Chernobyl accident: 0.002; Nuclear power production:0.0002. |
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CONTENTS Editorial ----------------------------------1 Radiological Surveillance for Industrial Gama Radiography 2-3,6 Interview -------------------------------4-6 List of documents published ----7-8 |
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VOL. 13 NO.2 2000 |
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RADIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE FOR INDUSTRIAL GAMA RADIOGRAPHY |
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A.U. Sonawane Industrial and Radiation Safety Division, AERB INTRODUCTION Industrial radiography using ionizing radiation is an indispensable, versatile and well known Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) method, which is internationally accepted all over. The technique is used to “see” inside the manufactured products such as metal castings or welded pipelines to find out whether the product contains flaws. This process is same as one that a medical doctors uses to x-ray a patient’s chest or a dentist uses to x-ray a patient’s teeth. The origin of industrial radiography goes back to December 1895, when the German scientist Wilhelm Roentgen) discovered x-rays and a year later, he made a radiograph of his shotgun that showed flaws in the barrels. Gamma radiography got its start in United States in 1929 at the National Research Laboratory for the Department of Navy to test thick steel castings. Radiography using gamma radiation sources, mainly Cobalt-60 and lridium-192, started in 1946, shortly after World War II, Industrial radiography, no doubt, is a powerful tool, but it involves some radiation risk if not practiced as per stipulated safe procedures. WHY REGULATORY CONTROL IS ESSENTIAL? Since the 1950’s there has been steady growth of gamma radiography exposure devices in the country. The number of radioactive materials, mainly Iridium-192 & Cobalt-60, deployed in the field of industrial radiography are constantly increasing. In view of their handling in sizable number of industrial premises, there is a probability of radiation hazards to the occupational workers and members of the public, if not handled safely. During the period from 1978-1999, there are about 85 different types of unusual incidents including missing of radiography equipment /sources involving avoidable exposure to occupational workers and in a few cases to the members of the public. Main |
causes of these incidents are poor maintenance of gamma radiography exposure devices, execution of radiography work without adhering to safe radiography work procedures stipulated in AERB Safety Guides, non-compliance with provisions stipulated for safe transport: of radiography sources and lack of management control over radiography personnel. This has drawn the attention of the regulators to further strengthen the regulatory control over safe handling of radioactive materials in the field of industrial radiography. About 1100 radiography devices are deployed in India in this field, using approximately a total activity of 1.1PBq (30,000 Ci of Ir-192) and 110 TBq (3000 Ci of Co -60) for the inspection of a variety of welds, castings etc. on shop floor or at radiography sites. These devices are used by more than 400 radiography institutions at almost 500 radiography sites located all over the country. Maximum number of industrial radiography cameras are portable and involve their frequent transport from one radiography site to another and hence their safe use is mostly based on good operational procedures. AERB’s REGULATORY CONTROL PROGRAMME The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) was constituted on November 23, 1983 under section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act 1962 (33 of 1962) to carry out certain regulatory and safety functions envisaged under section 16, section 17 and section 23 of the Act. The regulatory authority of AERB is derived from the rules and notifications promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. One of the main responsibilities of AERB is to enforce rules and regulations for ensuring radiological safety in multifarious uses of radioactive materials and radiation generating equipment in the field of medicine, industry, research, training etc. The Chairman AERB is designated as the Competent Authority under the Radiation Protection Rules (RPR), 1971, promulgated under the Act, for |
enforcing regulations pertaining to radiation safety framed under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The regulatory control for industrial radiography is mainly governed by the following, 1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1962. 2. The Radiation Protection Rules 1971. 3. G.S.R. No. 735, the Notification entitled, .“The Industrial Radiography (Radiation Surveillance Procedures), 1980". 4. AERB Safety Codes on Enclosed/Open filed radiography and Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials. 5. AERB safety Standard on Radiological Safety for the Design and Construction of Apparatus for Gamma Radiography. 6. Document on “Procedures for the Safe Use of Industrial Radiography Sources during Field Radiography. (DRP/P-IND/1). The regulatory consent in the form of “authorization” is issued by the Competent Authority to handle radioactive materials for carrying out industrial radiography work. The authorization is issued subject to strict compliance with the following requirements, 1. AERB Type approved Gamma Radiography exposure device. 2. Proof of radiography work (Letter from radiography contract awarding party). 3. Availability of trained and certified radiation staff such as radiation safety officer (RSO), site-in-charge, and radiographer. 4. Personnel monitoring badges to all radiation workers 5. Adequate number of calibrated and properly working radiation monitoring instruments 6. Availability of emergency accessories, tools etc, |
Prior to issuing authorization for carrying Out radiography work, it is ensured through the inspection of proposed radiography installation/site by representative of the Competent Authority, that the regulatory requirements are satisfactorily met in respect of safe planning, design, operation of radiography installation; site management such as proper internal inspection system, maintenance of radiography source inventory; physical security; operating & emergency procedures, availability of emergency handling tools etc. Every approved radiography installation submits periodically, in a standard format, the radiation safety status reports indicating inventory of radiography sources in their possession, their locations and storage, radiation monitoring instruments, number of radiation workers etc. INSPECTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT Inspection and enforcement activities are the major features of the AERB’s Compliance Assurance Programme (CAP) for industrial radiography, which is aimed at ensuring that the stipulated regulatory requirements related to industrial radiography are correctly fulfilled in practice. AERB has created the Directorate of Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement (DRl & E) on December 31, 199 3 and one of its major functions is to carry out regulatory inspections including announced and un-announced type. The Industrial and Radiation Safety Division (lRSD) of DRI & E is responsible for carrying out such inspections of all the non-DAE (non-Department of Atomic Energy) institutions where radioactive materials and radiation generating machines are handled and used. It has been experienced in the past that minor violations of stipulated radiography provisions were observed in the case of announced inspections and thereby demonstrating adequate compliance with regulations. Soon after the formation of DRI&E, the industrial and Radiation Safety Division of AERB arranged, in co-ordination with RP&AD, BARC, the first un-announced inspections during January 17- 20, 1994 covering about 25 industrial radiography |
site located around cities of Surat, Bharuch, Baroda & Ahmedabad in the state of Gujrat. The prime intention of this un-announced inspection was to verify that the radiogrophy sources (Iridium —192 & Cobalt-60) used in industrial radiography work were handled in a safe manner. Inspection are carried out by persons authorized by the Competent Authority as per the Rule 31 of the RPR-1971. Since theft un-announced inspections are periodically carried out and about 100 radiography sites/institutions located all over the country are covered yearly in this surveillance programme. The annual inspection schedule for all the radiography institutions/sites, which are categorized into the four zones of the country, is drawn in the beginning of the year. The major violations which were observed during the inspections include source movements from one radiography site to another site without prior approval of the Competent Authority, operation of radiography exposure devices by uncertified persons (trainee radiographers), inadequate physical security to source storage rooms, improper radiation, survey instruments, unavailability of emergency accessories/safety records and not using PM badges while carrying out radiography work. These violations are categorized into four different classes from minor to extremely serious violations with an aim to streamline the enforcement actions. AERB enforces regulatory actions as contemplated in the Radiation Protection Rules, 1971 after assessing the radiological risk to the occupational workers and members of the public from violations/discrepancies observed. The show-cause notices and warning letters are issued before enforcement of any regulatory actions. The regulatory actions to be enforced are recommended by the Standing Committee for Industrial Radiography (SCIR) which has been constituted by the Competent Authority in January 6, 1995. Since then, SCIR has been reconstituted twice. It’s member-ship consists of experts from the filed of radiation protection, industrial applications of radiation and legal advisor of the department of atomic Energy. |
SCIR reviews safety-related issues in the field of industrial radiography and recommends appropriate action to the Competent Authority. The regulatory actions enforced by AERB include implementing the directive to surrender radiography exposure devices with source by the offending radiogrophy agency for a period ranging from minimum three months, sealing of the exposure devices at inspection site, suspension of radiography work at sites, withdrawal certificates of radiography personnel who failed in observing their duties, submission of “Undertaking” to AERB from such institutions stating to abide by stipulated safety procedures and assuring non-occurrence of the violations observed during inspections. Two radiography agencies and one of the radiography personnel challenged the regulatory actions enforced by the Competent Authority in the judicial Courts; however, the Court has upheld the actions enforced by the Competent Authority proving the necessity of enforcement of actions in the interest of public safety. FEEDBACK FROM UN-ANNOUNCE SURVEILLANCE The impact of enforcement of regulatory actions based on the violations/discrepancies observed during inspection is the strict adherence with stipulated safe work procedures by many radiography institutions and strengthening of physical security of the radiography sources at all the time by |
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INTERVIEW |
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Mr Rob McBride, Star World, interviewed Dr. K.S. Parthasarathy, Secretary, AERB, on May 30, 2000. (Parts of the interview were used by Starworld in the Focus Asia programme on June 25,2000.) Rob : First of all the general procedures in mining uranium ore in Jaduguda and the treatment of the wastes afterwards. How safe are those operations in Jaduguda?. KSP : The operations in Jaduguda mines are safe . The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is the agency enforcing the requirements, the safety related requirements in all radiation installations in the country including uranium mines. So we take care to ensure that the dose of workers are within the limits prescribed by us. We also restrict the limits of the releases from the uranium mines and the mill to the environment. We have given technical specifications. These limits are assigned by the Regulatory Board. We have a continuous monitoring system by independent professionals, independent of the management of the mines, reporting to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. They have been helping in all areas of measurement and dose control. We have the records with us and it very clearly indicates that the doses are all within the permissible limits. That does not mean that we are all happy. Being a regulator, I am always interested in improvement, for instance, as per the current status of the radiation doses to workers, the average dose is something like 1/3rd of the limit prescribed. But we wanted to improve. Why should it be one third? We always insist on having better ventilation, for instance. Can we augment the ventilation? Because that is the practice universally followed. ‘We are given a legal task of enforcing the safety stipulations and standards in the mines. We have all the data to show you that the releases are within the limits. Rob : Just to clarify one thing. You |
mentioned that there are limits. Doses are within the permissible limits. Those limits are set by yourself, based on what? Are they are set on internationally agreed standards? KSP : Yes, Indeed, India is one of the handful of countries which implemented the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The recommendations came in 1990. We knew it was coming. We had a meeting in 1989. We have enforced the recommendations on dose limits in a phased way. Currently, our dose limits are on par with those recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. As a matter of fact, our maximum limit is a bit more conservative, because, our maximum limit is 30 mSv whereas ICRP limit is 50 mSv. But as a regulator, I am not interested in the maximum limit, I am interested in the average performance and there again we are on par with any country in the world. Rob : When you talk about the dosage received by some of the workers of the mines claims have been made by various pressure groups that working standards down below ground are not up to the international standards. For instance, the protective clothing, etc. KSP : That is not true. We must also remember Atomic Energy Regulatory Board has various inputs. We have a Unit Safety Committee which looks at the operation regularly. The latest meeting was in March. Now they look at these data. We have an inspection team. We have a Directorate of Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement. We sent those teams. They look at the radiation doses, they look at the limits, they look at the discharge values. We don’t just believe the Health Physics Unit alone. Health Physics Unit is an independent body collecting and keeping the data. We look at these data. This is another input. Inspection input we have, and all this data we have and also we clear the operation only after ensuring that these things are carried out. So the question |
of protective clothing. For instance. Protective clothing is required at the last stage where there is the drying of yellow cake is the area where activity is highest. There we have an enclosure with glass and when they really handle it most of the things are done automatically for instance the drying operation. For instance, if they have to do that they have been given respirators, they are given protective clothing. All these things have been implemented. We do go, check, let me tell you. Not only this in the Uranium mills we get information from anonymous channels. We work on it. If anonymously somebody tells that things are not proper in a particular installation we do go and do our own survey, our own inspection. Rob : As they existed in the past, have they always applied to the same standards? KSP : Yes, Regulatory Body was set up in 1983. Till that time there was in-house safety committees looking at all this. We needed improvements. We always insist on for instance, improvement in ventilation. Similarly, barricades for the tailing pond. Often the villagers break in. There are instances of this type. We have always directed that these barricades should be erected at all cost. Boards are kept. Let me also bring to your notice one important point which I wanted to emphasize. Uranium tailing pond is something and tailing material is known all over the world as a problem in the sense that, if we look at the whole world about 18 countries have got uranium mining capability. Something like 20 million tons of tailings are added every year to the tailing pond. If we take United States, I am not taking single country as an example, about 200 million tons of tailings are added in 26 sites. They are lying there now. There are 24 sites which are abandoned after mining and that is about 26 million tons of tailings. The total tailings in India are about 0.5 million tons. Coming back to the way you handle the tailing pond, |
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lot of things have been said about the tailing pond. In Colorado, Grand Junction, they removed the tailings which were extremely fine, beautiful sand; they carted away in the late sixties, the sand was taken and houses were made with them. They had to remove 4400 habitations at a cost of $150 million. So we are aware of all these problems. Rob : What are the standards, the accepted norms of treating a tailing pond? It is claimed that the tailing ponds are not lined. Do they have to be lined? KSP : Not necessarily. The condition was, over the years, I am talking about natural embankments were always used. But in fact whatever coming into the tailings pond they have system such that the ground water is not contaminated, for instance, tailing ponds are in many countries sq. miles. We have over 100 acres of tailing pond actually. Progressively improvements have been made. If you take the latest tailing pond there is a dam with impervious lining. Rob : The villagers claim that they have access to the tailing pond; cattle graze there. In fact, we have seen that there are no actual signs to say “don’t come in”. KSP : As t said earlier certainly there are instances where barricades are being broken. We are aware of that and we have always directed them to erect the barriers to ensure that people do not get into the area. Also let me present another factor. This is not to underestimate the problem. Tailing pond, as I said earlier contains radioactive material. It should be respected. Suppose somebody is walking on it, for instance, now a person has to stand there four hours a day 365 days to get somewhere near the permissible limit. Will anybody meditate like that. May be casually some persons are going. I am not supporting that practice. Rob : You mean they have to be there four hours a day, 365 days to get the permissible limit of dose... KSP : And measurements have been done. In fact many journalists have come over, the health physicists have demonstrated this by measurement, went to the pond, showed that the levels are |
four to five times the natural background. About 20 metres away, it as good as natural background. The natural background radiation level itself is varying in the country. On the one hand, if you wanted to have minimum background radiation level you go to the Minicoy Island it is only something like 23 mRem and in parts of Kerala it is 1000 times more. ( Millirem is a unit of dose; in a typical chest x-ray examination the patient receives a skin dose of about 20 millirem). Rob : Moving on from the tailing pond to the villagers who live close to that they claim a whole list of things which they claim are attributed to pollution from radioactivity, the low fertility rate, congenital deformities. What is your reaction to this? KSP : It is not possible because as I suggested earlier, we have the data of the releases from the mill and the mine. They have not exceeded the permissible limits which are internationally accepted. We have not seen the limit to the public exceeded. This radiation dose cannot give the maladies which are allegedly being mentioned earlier. Naturally, in 5% of all births, there is some defect or the other, for instance, it may be an extra finger or something else. Rob : This is so any where in the world? KSP : Yes, In India also the data are of the same order. I was told about health data collected at the instance of the Department of Atomic Energy. AERB did not carry out the study. I understand from the data that nothing surprising was found. What was found was similar to that seen in other areas. Rob : What will you attribute the deformities to? KSP : I have already mentioned to you that at a time about 5% of the population is likely to have congenital defects. The area is endemic in tuberculosis and tuberculosis is not caused by radiation. Certainly I know what is happening in the mine, I know what is happening in the tailing pond and I have data from the beginning and the releases have not exceeded the limit. If we take the natural background radiation all over the place it is not different from normal natural |
background in other areas. Over the years, the presence of the mining and the tailing pond has not added, anything extra to the background radiation in that area. So how can anybody attribute one case here and another case there to this sort of radiation . It is not possible. Rob : They say they have carried out study of 2700 women which show the anecdotally low fertility rate and children dying at the time of birth, etc. KSP : It is not possible. As I said radiation cannot be the reason because we have the record of the releases. Rob : The medical study undertaken two years ago was not undertaken by you. KSP : It was not undertaken by AERB. Rob : Are you confident of this result? KSP : I did not find anything surprising. Because similar results are seen all over the place. I am not saying that this study was so elaborate to tell everything. After all it is only a cross sectional survey of health status. Nothing astonishing, nothing shocking or surprising was found. I broadly agree with whatever observations they made. Rob : The pressure groups have called for a multi disciplined independent study of the area etc. What is your reaction? Are you confident that any survey or monitoring is independent enough? KSP : As far as I am concerned, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is independent. We have been acting on our mandate. We have been thoroughly monitoring /surveying this area, all areas including the uranium mines and I have all the records to show that radioactivity has not gone in to any of these areas. Whatever you have found is simply natural background radiation and is the same as in any other place in India and when that is certain I do not think there is need for any other study. Rob : We took a couple of samples from Chatikocha village near one of the |
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tailing pond. and got it analysed from Hong Kong University. Can I show you the results? KSP : Why not? It is again a matter of faith against somebody else. I have all the data with me. So there is no question..... Rob : If I can show you this (showing a sheet of paper).This sample was taken from a well in the village of Chatikocha. This is a sample of grass and well water from the area. The grass did not show anything significant. But they came back with a figure for the well water which apparently is 5 times the WHO limit. KSP : I have no comments on this because. These are all isolated samples. You know what we do? We are not doing just one sample. It is we observe what is the frequency of sample to be taken. You know how many samples are to be taken? They collect samples of sediments, water and air and this has been going on continuously over the years. We have all the data with me I do not know how Hong Kong University or for that matter any other University got the data and this is not one sample. We are having a system upto25 km distance even gamma radiation level measurements and the critical sample we want to analyse. They are samples of water, air,.... Rob : This is never said to be a completely scientific study. A couple of samples... KSP : I totally wanted to disagree on this. The representative sampling done by our specialists are independently reviewed by AERB. I also wanted to emphasize this. Our data does not show any anomalies of |
this type and this representative samples that is what I was telling. It is not one isolated sample. Rob : Now I understand that. When you see claims being made against Jaduguda something that has gone on for five to six years especially people who are making the allegations, is there a suspicion that may be it isn’t just the tribals the people who live around the village. Do you think there is some level of political activity? KSP : I have no comment on that. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board has a certain function, that is, to go by the mandate given under Sections 16 and 17 of the Atomic Energy Act. Even if any government, any other agency violates this or any of the norms set up by us we will act on it. I have no comments what is going on in tribal areas. Our norm, our mandate is to protect the environment, reduce the dose to radiation workers and ensure that the standards which we prescribe are followed. That is all. I am not a political person and I have no comments on that. As far as this data is concerned I am absolutely convinced that, absolutely there is no problems because like any other radiation installations mind you Atomic Energy Regulatory Board has a very wide responsibility and we have been carrying out them. It is just like somebody saying that you are a government servant what is your credibility? The question of credibility is based on professionalism and I think we have acquired enough experience in handling uranium in this country. May be we are handling 0.5 million tons of |
tailings compared to 200 million tons in the United States, we have been able to establish this practice fairly safely. Certainty, improvement is always wanted, not only in this, in any area. Why there is a regulatory board? A second person has to look into it and this has been done.. We have not found any problem in making our mandate effective. Let me tell you that... Rob : Finally, any nuclear industry, nuclear power industry and the mining that goes with it brings with it responsibilities.. Do you think India is disposing of that its responsibility adequately? KSP : Yes Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is doing it and we have the records. The Regulatory Board came in 1983. The nuclear business started in 1948. The Atomic Energy Act came in 1948. Let us look at the regulatory mechanism. Originally it was an in-house committee. Even in 1983, again part of the functions were carried out by in-house committee. But in 1987 regulatory processes were reviewed by the Government. From 1987 onwards it is AERB, an independent organization. We never erred in executing out duty just because money was involved. Safety measures are paramount and we have been executing them year after year. We are thankful to you for coming and talking to us. We have issued a press release on the topic. But this is the first time somebody came and talked to us. We are grateful to you for this. Rob : Thank you very much. |
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(....Contd. from page 3) providing secured source storage facilities. Radiographic personnel started appreciating the need for safety culture. The common violations/discrepancies revealed during inspections were reviewed by AERB and based on it, following changes are brought out in the existing regulatory procedures for monitoring radiation safety in industrial radiography. 1. The period of experience of trainee radiographer was not specified earlier and the same has been reduced from a period of one year to minimum six months. 2. Procedures have been simplified to |
obtain approval of Competent Authority for movement of radiography sources from one authorized radiography site to another authorized radiography site. 3. Fresh safety review to arrive at proper decision is initiated in respect of source storage facilities presently located in residential or office-cum-residential premises from the viewpoint of physical security & radiation safety. 4. Formats/protocols for maintenance of daily logbook records, source movement applications were reviewed and amended. |
Inspection checklist is being reviewed to cover all the necessary information in respect of radiography installation/site. 6. The inventory of exposure devices containing depleted uranium as shielding material is |
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED TILL SEPTEMBER 22, 2000 |
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1 Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996 1996 2 Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting AERB/SC/S 1990 3 Code of Practice on Design for Safety in Pressurised Heavy Water Based Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SC/D 1989 4 Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Operation AERB/SC/O 1989 5 Code of Practice on Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SC/QA 1988 6 Safety Code for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities AERB/SC/G 2000 7 Safety Code for Telegarnma Therapy Equipment and Installations AERB/SC/MED-1 1986 8 Safety Code for Medical Diagnostic X-ray Equipment and Installations AERB/SC/MED-2 1986 9 Safety Code for Brachytherapy Sources, Equipment and Instatlations AERB/SC/MED-3 1987 10 Safety Code for Nuclear Medicine Laboratories AERB/SC/MED-4 1989 11 Safety Code on Operation and Maintenance of Land Based Stationary Gamma Irradiators AERB/SC/IRRAD 1993 12 Safety Code for the Transport of Radioactive Materials AERB/SS/TR-1 1986 13 Safety Code on Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Transport Accidents involving Radioactive Material AERB/SC/TR-3 1990 ] 4 Civil Engineering Structures Important to Safety of Nuclear Facilities AERB/SS/CSE 1998 15 Standards for Fire Protection Systems of Nuclear Facilities AERB/S/IRSD-1 1996 16 Standard Specifications for Radiological Safety for the Design and Construction of Industrial Gamma Radiography Exposure Devices and Source Changers. AERB/SS-1 1992 17 Standard Specifications for Radiological Safety in the Design, Construction and use of Industrial Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices. AERB/SS-2 1990 18 Standard Specifications for Classification and Testing of Sealed Radioactive Sources. AERB/SS-3 1990 19 Standard Specifications for Radiological Safety in the Design and Manufacture of Consumer Products Containing Radioactive Substances. AERB/SS-4 1991 20 Standard Specifications for Radiological Safety in the Design and Manufacture of X-ray Analysis Equipment AERB/SS-5 1992 21 Standard Specifications for Radiological Safety for the Design and Installation of Land-Based Stationary Gamma Irradiators AERB/SS-6 1993 22 Hydrological Dispersion in Relation to Nuclear Power Plant Siting AERB/SG/S-2 1998 23 Design Basis Flood for Nuclear Power Plants on Inland Sites AERB/SG/S-6A 1998 24 Population Distribution and Analysis in Relation to Siting of Nuclear Pbwer Plants AERB/SG/S-9 1998 25 Safety Guide for Seismic Studies and Design Basis Ground Motion for Nuclear Power Plant Sites AERB/SG/S-11 1990 26 Fire Protection in Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/D-4 1999 27 Design Basis Events for Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor AERB/SG/D-5 2000 28 Core Reactivity Control in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors AERB/SG/D-7 1998 29 Ultimate Heat Sink and Associated Systems in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor AERB/SG/D-15 2000 30 Vapour Suppression System (Pool Type) for Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor AERB/SG/D-22 2000 31 Staffing, Recruitment, Training, Qualification and Certification of Operating Personnel of NPPs AERB/SG/O-1 1999 |
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Shri Santosh H. Shinde and Kum. Shobha B. Gachi were awarded with Merit Certificate from AERB for successfully completing the 7th Batch Health Physics Stipendiary Training Course. They received cash awards from AERB for securing 1st and 2nd rank respectively in the examination. |
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32 Operational Limits and Conditions of Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/O-3 1999 33 Commissioning Procedures for Pressurised Heavy Wafer Reactor based Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/O-4 1998 34 Radiation Protection during Operation of Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/O-5 1998 35 Preparedness of Operating Organisation for Handling Emergencies at Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/O-6 2000 36 Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/O-7 1998 37 Surveillance of Items Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/O-8 1999 38 Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation AERB/SG/O-9 1998 39 Core Management and Fuel Handling in Operation of Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors AERB/SG/O-10A 1998 40 Core Management and Fuel Handling in Boiling Water based NPPs AERB/SG/O-10B 1999 41 Renewal of Authorisation for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/O-12 2000 42 Quality Assurance in the Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/QA-2 1998 43 Quality Assurance in the Manufacture of Items for Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SG/QA-3 1998 44 Safety Guide on Quality Assurance during Commissioning and Operation of NPP AERB/SG/QA-5 1993 45 Preparation of Site Emergency Preparedness Plans for Nuclear Facilities AERB/SG/EP-1 1999 46 Preparation of Off-site Emergency Preparedness Plans for Nuclear Facilities AERB/SG/EP-2 1999 47 Preparation of Site Emergency Preparedness Plans for Non-nuclear Installations AERB/SG/EP-3 2000 48 Preparation of Off-site Emergency Preparedness Plans for Non-nuclear Installations AERB/SG/EP-4 2000 49 Role of Regulatory Body with Respect to Emergency Response and Preparedness at Nuclear and Radiation Facilities AERB/SG/G-5 2000 50 Safety Guide for Works Contract Safety AERB/SG/IS-I 1992 51 Safety Guide on Radiological Safety in Enclosed Radiography Installations AERB/SG/IN-1 1986 52 Safety Guide on Open Field Industrial Radiography AERB/SG/IN-2 1987 53 Safety Guide for Handling of Radiation Emergencies in Industrial Radiography AERB/SG/IN-3 1989 54 Safety Guide on Compliance Assurance Programme for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material AERB/SG/TR-1 1991 55 Safety Guide on Standards of Safety in Transport of Radioactive Material AERB/SG/TR-2 1991 56 Safety Guide on Procedure for Forwarding Transport, Handling and Storage of Radioactive Consignments AERB/SG/TR-3 1991 57 Safety Guide for Intervention Levels and Derived Intervention Levels for Off-Site Radiation Emergency AERB/SG/HS-1 1993 58 Safety Guide on Medical Management of Persons Exposed in Radiation Accidents AERB/SG/MED-1 1990 59 Safety Manual Governing Authorisation Procedure for Nuclear Power Plants/Projects AERB/M/NSD-3 1989 60 Safety Manual for Civil Engineering and Building Works for Nuclear Power Plants AERB/SM-S-1 1988 61 Radiation Protection for Nuclear Facilities (Revision 3) AERB/SM/ 1996 62 Safety Manual for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities AERB/SM/Decom 1998 63 Safety Manual on Data Base Management for Accidents/ Diseases Happening due to Occupation and Implementation of the same in the Deportment of Atomic Energy AERB/SM/IS-1 1991 64 Technical Manual on Methods for the Measurement of Radon and Thoron and their Progeny in Dwellings. AERB/TM/RM-1 1992 65 Safety Manual - Site Emergency Plan for Nuclear Installations AERB/M/NISD-1 1986 66 Safety Manual- Off-site Emergency Plan for Nuclear installations AERB/M/NISD 1988 67 Safety Manual on Atlas of Reference Plans for Medical Diagnostic X-ray Installations AERB/SM/MED-1 1988 68 Safety Manual - Handbook for Medical Management of Persons Exposed in Radiation Accidents AERB/SM/MED-2 1989 69 Safety Report Format for Individual Plants other than Nuclear Power Plants (Safety Manual) AERB/M/ISD-1 1990 70 Catalogue of Earthquakes in Peninsular India - AERB Technical Document AERB/TD/CSE-1 1993 71 Personal Protective Equipment: Helmets PPE-1 1992 72 Personal Protective Equipment: Safety Footwear PPE-2 1992 73 Personal Protective Equipment: Respiratory Protective Equipment PPE-3 1992 74 Personal Protective Equipment: Arm and Hand Protection PPE-4 1992 75 Personal Protective Equipment: Eye and Face Protection PPE-5 1992 76 Personal Protective Equipment: Protective Clothing and Coverall PPE-6 1992 77 Personal Protective Equipment: Ear Protection PPE-7 1992 78 Personal Protective Equipment: Safety Belts and Harnesses PPE-8 1992 |
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