Page 186 - AERB Annual Report 2020
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INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE (INES)
                   Level / Descriptor                Name of the Events                     Examples
                                    •   Major  release:  Widespread  health  and  environmental   Chernobyl NPP, USSR
                          7                                                            (now in Ukraine), 1986
                       MAJOR            effects requiring implementation of planned and extended
                      ACCIDENT          countermeasures.                               Fukushima NPP,
                                                                                       Japan , 2011
                          6         •   Signicant release: Likely to require full implementation   Kyshtym Reprocessing
                       SERIOUS          of planned countermeasures.                    Plant, Russia, 1957
                      ACCIDENT
                                    •   Limited release: Likely to require full implementation of
                                                                                      Windscale pile,UK, 1957
                                        planned countermeasures.                      Three Mile Island,NPP,
                          5         •   Severe  damage  to  reactor  core  /  several  deaths  from
                   ACCIDENT WITH        radiation.                                    USA, 1979
                       WIDER        •   Release of large quantities of radioactive material within   Goiania , Brazil, 1987
                   CONSEQUENCES         an installation with a high probability of signicant public
                                        exposure. This could arise from a major critically accident
                                        or re.

                                    •   Minor release of radioactive material unlikely to result in   Tokaimuro, Japan, 1999
                                        implementation of planned countermeasures other than   Saint-Laurent des Eaux
                          4             local food controls.
                      ACCIDENT                                                         NPP, France, 1980
                        WITH        •   Fuels melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1%   Fleurus, Belgium, 2006
                       LOCAL            release of core inventory.                     Mayapuri Incident,
                   CONSEQUENCES     •   At least one death from radiation/ release of signicant   New Delhi,India ,2010
                                        quantities  of  radioactive  material  within  an  Installation
                                        with a high probability of signicant public exposure.
                                    •   Near  accident  of  an  NPP  with  no  safety  provisions   Vandellous NPP,
                                        remaining.                                     Spain, 1989
                                    •   H i g h l y   r a d i o a c t i v e   s e a l e d     s o u r c e   l o s t   o r   Ikiteli,Turkey, 1999.
                                        stolen/misdelivered  without  adequate  radiation
                          3             procedures in place to handle it.              Sellaeld, UK, 2005
                       SERIOUS      •   Exposure rates of more than 1Sv/h in an operating area.   Yanango, Peru, 1999
                      INCIDENT      •   Severe contamination in an area not excepted by design,
                                        with a low probability of signicant public exposure.
                                    •   Exposure in excess of ten times the statutory annual limit
                                        for  workers/  Non-lethal  deterministic  health  effect
                                        (e.g.burns) from radiation.
                                    •   Signicant failures in safety provisions but with no actual   Forsmark , Sweden ,
                                        consequences.                                  2006
                                    •   Exposure  of  member  of  public  in  excess  of  10mSv/
                                        exposure  of  a  worker  in  excess  of  the  statutory  annual   Atucha, Argentina,
                                        limits/ Radiation level in an opening area of more than 50   2005
                          2             mSv/h
                      INCIDENT      •   Signicant contamination within the facility into an area
                                        not expected by design.
                                    •   Found highly radioactive sealed orphan source, device or
                                        transport  package  with  safety  provision  intact/
                                        inadequate  packaging  of  highly  radioactive  material
                                        sealed source.
                                    •   Minor  problems  in  safety  components  with  signicant   Breach of operating
                                        defence  in  depth  remaining    low  activity  lost  or  stolen   limits  at  a  nuclear
                          1             radioactive source. Device or transport package   facility  /  thieft
                      ANOMALY
                                    •   Overexposure of member of public in excess of statutory   radioactive source.
                                        limits.

                          0
                     DEVIATIONS      No safety signicance.
                    BELOW SCALE





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